As the heads of states of NATO countries gather in Warsaw, they face several significant challenges, not the least of which is the threat of terrorism from the self-proclaimed Islamic State and other radical groups planning attacks on member countries. But for the first time in many years, Russia poses an active military threat to the alliance. NATO leaders should focus on keeping the pressure on Putin using the language he understands best: the power of action over rhetoric.
That the Kremlin is an adversary of the West is of course nothing new, but Russia’s recent behavior has made that threat much more concrete. The alliance faces the distinct possibility that Russia might actually take aggressive action against a NATO country in the near term, most likely one located along Russia’s border. And while this security threat is real, there is an even more pressing challenge facing the alliance: the need to send an unmistakably clear message to Putin regarding how seriously the alliance takes the Russian threat, and how serious the alliance is about ensuring the security and territorial integrity of all its members. Failing to send this message—that NATO will take action—could well increase the likelihood of a Russian incursion.
Despite the recent intensification of Russian military activity, there will inevitably be political second-guessing on how and whether to send a strong message to the Kremlin. Some will argue that continuing troop deployments, training, and establishing and expanding NATO bases will be overly provocative, forcing Russia to respond even more strongly, thereby risking escalation that could end in armed conflict. Others may claim that NATO itself is to be blamed for overreacting to Russia, and that the alliance needs to take a more measured approach. Still others may conclude that the Russian argument of NATO breaking its promises not to expand after the dissolution of the Soviet Union is a valid one, and the Kremlin is now justified in taking more aggressive measures. NATO decision makers and Western politicians should understand that Putin is counting on this happening. The Kremlin is well acquainted with Western hand-wringing, views it as a quaint weakness inherent in democratic society, and takes great advantage of it whenever possible.
The argument that NATO “expansion” is a betrayal of an agreement made between the alliance and Moscow at the end of the Cold War is a good example. Quite apart from whether this is true (and most, including former Russian President Mikhail Gorbachev, agree that there was no such agreement, formal or otherwise), Russia understands that the Western concepts of fairness, keeping one’s word, and not taking advantage of a vanquished foe can be used effectively against Europe and the United States. The Kremlin knows that some Western politicians, thinkers, and some segments of society might accept, perhaps even with a twinge of guilt, that all of Russia’s geopolitical actions in Europe and Eurasia over the past ten years are nothing more than a response to NATO expansion. In essence, the Kremlin would have us believe it’s all NATO’s fault. Putin’s highly efficient propaganda programs tirelessly sing this tune, and his intelligence services search for those in NATO countries willing to support this position.
The reality is starkly different than the narrative Russia hopes to impose upon the West. Looking back over the past two decades, Russia has worked to establish frozen conflicts in areas where Moscow wishes to maintain de facto control without directly challenging international law (think Transnistria and Nagorno-Karabakh, for example).
The Russian invasion of Georgia in 2008, which resulted in the Kremlin effectively wresting away a large portion of Georgian territory, was a step further, directly introducing Russian military forces into the equation. While Georgia was not a NATO member, it is clear that Russia was not comfortable with Tbilisi’s movement – politically, economically, and socially – towards the West.
More recently, the annexation of Crimea and direct military support of Moscow-sponsored separatists in eastern Ukraine, both clear violations of international law, represent the next step forward in Russian regional planning. Putin’s strategic goal is returning Russia to great power status, but how far he will go in this attempt remains unclear. It is precisely this uncertainty that makes the current situation so dangerous and NATO’s response so critical.
While NATO’s strategists must certainly continue to plan for Russian military aggression against member states, it is just as important that they send Russia strong, unequivocal messages backed with actions, not only words. While there is nothing wrong with engaging Russia via diplomatic and other bilateral channels, it would be a mistake to overly rely on this approach. Putin is testing NATO resolve and cohesion. The Russian air force has been pushing the envelope by flying dangerously close to (and occasionally in to) NATO member state airspace and aircraft. In late 2014, the Russian security services kidnapped an Estonian intelligence officer on the border between the two countries and incarcerated him in Moscow. Aggressive propaganda operations, a prelude to “hybrid warfare” the Kremlin used in eastern Ukraine, are on the rise across Europe. Social media has expanded the reach of these operations even further.
The Baltic countries have particular reason to be worried, given the Putin doctrine of “where there is a Russian expatriate population, there is Russia.” It is not out of the realm of the possible that Putin is considering whether now is the time to test NATO’s commitment to Article 5, the mutual defense portion of the treaty which stipulates an attack against one member state is an attack against all. After all, Putin may reason, the West chose not to respond militarily after Crimea’s annexation, or Ukraine, or Georgia—perhaps NATO might also choose an easier route on Lithuania or Latvia or Estonia.
In order to make it clear to Russia that accelerating towards a hybrid war or perhaps even an armed incursion into a NATO country will be met decisively with force, NATO must continue to increase its deployment of equipment and personnel, as well as its overall activity level in those countries that border Russia, especially in the Baltics. Looking elsewhere for potential hotspots with Russia, NATO should not forget Romania. Romania shares a border with Moldova, which has its own Moscow-created frozen conflict; Putin could easily increase tensions in Transnistria and use this as an excuse to threaten NATO’s southern flank.
Russia will of course continue to publicly decry the increase in NATO activity, threaten to respond in kind, and raise the specter of war. Putin calculates that the West will second-guess itself, will begin to doubt whether the risk is worth it, and will wonder whether Russia is perhaps right. The Kremlin hopes it can convince Western politicians it really is the West’s fault that Russia feels threatened, and that NATO will dial back its actions accordingly.
This is why it is absolutely crucial that NATO send a strong, unequivocal message: We are not intent on invading or weakening Russia, but we will not simply overlook recent, tangible Russian aggression. Russia went to war with Georgia and effectively carved off a piece of that country, which is now under Russian control. Russia annexed Crimea. Russia actively supports the separatists in eastern Ukraine, and is the only reason that conflict continues. Russia continues to act in a provocative fashion towards the Baltics. As a result of these specific Russian actions, and for no other reason, NATO must respond. And for Russia, actions speak much louder than words. Action is the language of power; the language Putin understands best.